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Avoiding Wrongful Convictions:
Re-examining the “Wrong-Person” Defense
Lissa Griffin ∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a “meaningful
1
opportunity to present a complete defense.” Grounded in several
2
different constitutional provisions, this right has been invoked as a
defense to criminal charges in a variety of contexts and has been sus3
tained by the Supreme Court on several occasions. Probably no context, however, has been as controversial and difficult for the courts to
administer as when a person accused of a crime seeks to prove his innocence by attempting to show that somebody else committed the
crime.
4
This “wrong person” defense was first recognized by the Su5
preme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi in 1976 and was reaffirmed in
∗
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1
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
2
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (locating the right in the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth Amendment compulsory process and confrontation clauses).
3
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967).
4
The defense that alleges that someone other than the defendant committed
the crime has had several names. It has been called the “third-party perpetrator” defense, the “third-party culpability” defense, the “alternative perpetrator” defense, and
the “SODDI defense”—an acronym for “Some Other Dude Did It.” See David
McCord, “But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!”: The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by
a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L. REV. 917, 920
(1996). The simplest name for the defense seems to be the “wrong person” defense,
and that is the name that will be used in this Article. As noted herein, the defense
has two parts: first, that the defendant did not commit the crime; and second, that
someone else did. The defense as a whole will be referred to as “the wrong-person
defense.” The evidence supporting the second prong—evidence that someone else
committed the crime—will be referred to as “third-party guilt evidence.”
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Holmes v. South Carolina. In Chambers, the Court reversed a murder
conviction in a case in which the defendant offered convincing proof
that he was not the killer but was prevented by the trial judge’s application of state hearsay rules from proving that a third person admit7
ted several times to having committed the crime. The Court held
that the exclusion of this third-party guilt evidence violated the defendant’s right to present a complete defense, a right that is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
8
the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment.
Most recently, in Holmes, also a murder case, the Court reversed
a conviction where the defendant’s attempt to introduce proof that a
third party committed the crime was again frustrated by state evidentiary rules. This time, the state rules prohibited the introduction of
third-party guilt evidence where the prosecutor’s forensic evidence, if
9
believed, is strong. As in Chambers, the Court held that the exclusion
of the defendant’s proof violated the defendant’s right to present a
10
complete defense.
While the Holmes Court reaffirmed the constitutional status of
11
the right to present a complete defense, the Court explicitly declined to depart from or criticize current state trial practices that impose, under various tests, an extremely heavy evidentiary burden on
an accused to prove that he is innocent by introducing proof of a
12
third party’s culpability. However, as this Article demonstrates, the
states’ treatment of this wrong-person defense is confusing, inconsistent, and insufficiently protective of a defendant’s constitutional right
to present a complete defense. Indeed, state evidentiary rules typically exclude such evidence unless a defendant can establish a direct
13
and convincing connection between the third party and the crime.
Moreover, even when a defendant is able to offer substantial proof of
a third party’s culpability, state evidentiary rules typically exclude
such evidence on the ground that it will confuse and mislead the jury
and thereby prejudice the orderly and efficient operation of the
14
trial. When, under the lenient abuse-of-discretion standard for evi5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

410 U.S. 284 (1973).
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 284.
Id. at 285, 302–03.
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323–24, 329, 331.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 326–27.
See infra text accompanying notes 152–64.
See infra notes 190, 210–23 and accompanying text.
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dentiary rulings, the intermediate court reviews the refusal to admit
third-party guilt evidence, the trial court’s decision is almost always
15
affirmed. Ironically, then, although there is increasing documentation both anecdotally and empirically that innocent defendants are
16
being wrongfully convicted, the courts continue to exclude proof of
a third person’s culpability because either they do not believe that
the prosecution has charged the wrong person or they do not want
the case to be complicated by evidence of someone else’s culpability.
The Supreme Court’s failure to impose clear standards on the
admissibility of third-party guilt evidence arises largely because the
wrong-person defense is unique from other defenses. Most defenses
seek to counter the prosecution’s proof by showing that the defendant did not commit the crime, either because he is not the right
person (e.g., alibi, misidentification, false confession, or lying witnesses), that he is not responsible for the crime (e.g., insanity or diminished capacity), or that the defendant is not guilty because the
prosecution is unable to prove every element of the crime (e.g., lack
of proof of intent, value, and so forth). The wrong-person defense,
by contrast, has two discrete parts: first, it seeks to convince the jury
that the defendant did not commit the crime, and, second, that some
17
other person did. The constitutional right to present a complete
18
defense embraces both parts. However, the states do not approach
the defense as a two-part issue or as a constitutional question; rather,
they evaluate it as a question of evidentiary admissibility, looking only
at the second prong of the defense—the proffer of third-party guilt
proof.
The lower courts’ treatment of the wrong-person defense ignores not only the substantive uniqueness of the defense but also the
practical difficulties facing a defendant in presenting sufficient evidence to support the defense. Rarely does an accused possess the resources required to adequately investigate and prove that someone
else committed the crime. Even when a defendant offers evidence
that he has been misidentified, either by impeaching an eyewitness or
presenting an alibi, a defendant often lacks the ability to discover and
present convincing evidence that connects the real perpetrator to the
crime. To be sure, a defendant fortuitously or as a result of investiga15

See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan.
4, 2009) (providing DNA exonerations count of 226 as of Jan. ,4 2009).
17
See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
18
See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. 284; Holmes, 547 U.S. 319.
16
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tion may be able to offer proof that another person had the opportunity, motive, or propensity to commit the crime, that another person
confessed to the crime, or that physical evidence connects another
person to the crime. However, instead of considering the limited
ability of a defendant to produce exonerating evidence, the courts
impose a demanding evidentiary standard that mechanically excludes
such evidence on the ground that it is collateral, misleading, or
19
prejudicial to the orderly and efficient functioning of the trial.
The lower courts should employ a constitutional analysis consistent with Chambers and Holmes that protects both states’ and defendants’ interests. As in the right to present a defense cases generally,
the courts should balance the state’s interest in reliable proof and
orderly trial procedure against the defendant’s constitutional right to
present a complete defense. Courts should not evaluate the permissibility of a wrong-person defense by mechanically balancing the probative value of proffered evidence against the likelihood that it would
create confusion. Instead, the courts should undertake a much more
rigorous analysis of the evidence that recognizes the uniqueness of
the wrong-person defense. First, the courts should determine
whether the defendant has made a threshold showing of innocence
by raising a credible claim that he is not the person who committed
the crime, either through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses
or defense proof. If that foundational requirement is met, the state’s
interest in excluding evidence against another person is diminished
and the defendant’s interest in supplementing his claim of innocence
is increased. At that point, the balancing test should create a presumption in favor of its admissibility.
The ability of a criminal defendant to present a credible wrongperson defense is more pressing today with the mounting evidence of
20
wrongful convictions through DNA proof. Paradoxically, as it becomes increasingly apparent that innocent people are convicted, the
courts continue to refuse to admit proof that someone else really is
guilty. Moreover, although a prosecution witness is almost always
permitted to point the finger at the defendant with only the barest of
reliability protections and no corroboration at all, defense witnesses
are routinely prohibited from pointing the finger at someone else.
An evolved notion of parity—which lies at the core of due process—

19

See infra notes 190, 210–23 and accompanying text.
See The Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, http://www.inn
ocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
20
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requires a fairer judicial inquiry into the admissibility of wrong21
person-defense evidence.
Part II of this Article reviews the history of the right to present a
defense and closely examines the United States Supreme Court’s
modern analysis of that right. Part III analyzes the emergence of the
right to present a defense that a third party committed the crime and
concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in South Carolina v. Holmes. Part IV then describes the current restrictive implementation of the wrong-person defense by the lower courts.
Part V argues that the constitutional right to present a wrong-person
defense is being insufficiently protected under current, arbitrary
standards, and prescribes a constitutional analysis of the defense that
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, more reflective
of what the lower courts actually are doing, and that is likely to produce more reliable results.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
The right to present a defense has deep historical roots. Although until the late sixteenth century there was no such right, in
1589 and 1606 Parliament enacted statutes that gave a defendant a
limited right to present witnesses, as long as the witnesses were not
22
23
sworn. Further, a defendant could not compel their attendance.
The right to subpoena witnesses and to have them testify under
24
oath was not recognized until the late seventeenth century. To settle hostilities between England and Scotland, Parliament enacted a
statute providing that Englishmen charged with crimes in Scotland
would be tried in England where they could subpoena witnesses and
25
place them under oath. Shortly thereafter, Parliament passed another statute giving the same rights to defendants charged with trea26
son in English courts. Interestingly, the basis for that right was par21

See infra notes 22–38 and accompanying text.
See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 84 (1975).
23
Id. In fact, until 1562, the common law courts did not even have their own
power to compel the attendance of witnesses. Id. In that year a statute was passed
that required witnesses to appear when served with process by courts of record. Id.
Subsequently, the common law courts began issuing subpoenas. Id. at 84–85. They
did not exercise this power in favor of defendants, however, because the courts swore
only witnesses who testified favorably for the prosecution. Id. at 85. By permitting
only prosecution witnesses to be sworn and instructing the jury to give greater weight
to sworn testimony, the courts skewed the balance heavily in favor of the prosecution.
Id. at 84–86.
24
Id. at 87.
25
Id. at 87 n.62.
26
Id. at 87.
22
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ity with the prosecution: the statute provided that defendants would
have the same power as the prosecution to compel witnesses to tes27
tify. Finally, in 1702, the right to swear witnesses was extended to
28
defendants in all felony cases. Compulsory process was extended by
29
the common law courts as well.
The right to present a defense was transported to the Colonies
30
with other rights contained in the royal charters. In addition, nine
of the new state constitutions—all but Connecticut, Georgia, New
York, and South Carolina—specifically provided for a defendant’s
31
right to produce witnesses in his favor. As in England, the states required parity, i.e., “that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecu32
tion, to establish the essential elements of his case.” Ultimately, the
Sixth Amendment was drafted to protect that right and was largely
33
uncontroversial.
Like its predecessors, the Compulsory Process
Clause was intended to mean that the defendant should have a
“meaningful opportunity, at least on a par with the prosecution, to
34
present a case in his favor through witnesses.”
27

See Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1063, 1073 & nn.28–29 (1999) (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2190 at 2960 (1st ed. 1904)).
28
Westen, supra note 22, at 87.
29
Thus, by the time of the revolution, Blackstone stated that “in all ca[s]es of
trea[s]on and felony, all witne[ss]es for the pri[s]oner [s]hould be examined upon
oath, in like manner as the witne[ss]es against him” and a defendant had “the [s]ame
compul[s]ive proce[s]s to bring in [h]is witne[ss]es for him, as was u[s]ual to compel their appearance again[s]t him.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 345,
354 (emphasis in original).
30
Westen, supra note 22, at 91 & n.78.
31
Id. at 94 & n.94.
32
Id. at 95.
33
During the constitutional debate, several states refused to ratify without a Bill
of Rights, and four of those states specifically proposed provisions for ensuring the
defense a right to present witnesses. Id. at 96. James Madison, the chief architect of
the Sixth Amendment, recognized that he needed the support of Virginia and New
York, and that neither would give their support without such a provision. Id. at 96–
97. Nevertheless, Madison’s formulation was not the same as Virginia’s, which provided a “right ‘to call for evidence.’” Id. at 97. Instead, Madison substituted the present language, possibly in reliance on Blackstone’s formulations, or simply to satisfy
the various states without adopting the recommendation of any single one of them.
Id. at 97–98. Regardless, the framers adopted James Madison’s draft of the Sixth
Amendment, almost without debate and largely as proposed. Id. at 98.
34
Unsurprisingly, when the first Congress implemented the compulsory process
clause, it specifically articulated the parity-based right to present a defense by giving
the alleged treasonor the right “to make any proof that he can produce, by lawful witness” and to have “like process of the court to compel his witnesses to appear at his
trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on behalf of the prosecution
against him.” Id. at 100–01 (citing Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9. § 29, 1 Stat. 119
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The first cases asserting a right to present a defense in the Supreme Court were decided pursuant to common law and not on con35
stitutional grounds. The first case, United States v. Reid, was an appeal from a murder conviction tried under federal admiralty law,
36
incorporating state law. The lower court excluded the testimony of
an accomplice under a Virginia statute that excluded the testimony of
37
an accomplice tried separately from the defendant. The Court upheld the exclusion, ruling that the right to call an accomplice as a defense witness was neither in the Bill of Rights nor the Judiciary Act of
38
1789.
Gradually the Supreme Court began to articulate due process
39
grounds for a right to be heard in civil cases. From there the Court
also found a due process right to present a defense in criminal cases,
a right that was violated by exclusion of defense evidence, but only
when a defense was prohibited in its entirety. Thus, for example, in
40
1925 in Cooke v. United States, the Court reversed a criminal conviction based on what it found to be a violation of a constitutional right
to present a defense. In Cooke, the defendant, an attorney, was held
in summary contempt based on a letter he had written to a federal
judge requesting that the judge recuse himself from several related
41
cases. Cooke admitted sending the letter but was prevented at trial
42
from making any statement in his defense. Subsequently, he was
43
convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment due process right to present a defense was

(1790) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970)). Shortly thereafter, in
1807, the compulsory process clause was applied in the infamous treason and misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. Id. at 101–07. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall
held that if the President denied the defense access to evidence that might bear on
the defendant’s innocence, the prosecution should be dismissed. Id. at 107.
35
53 U.S. 361 (1 How.) (1852), overruled by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467,
469–72 (1918).
36
Id. at 361–63.
37
Id.
38
Essentially, the Court dealt with state exclusion of evidence not on a constitutional basis but on the basis of state statute or the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers. Id. at 364–66. It was not until the 1960s that the exclusion of defense evidence
was presented as a constitutional issue. See infra notes 50–81 and accompanying text.
Reid was overruled in 1918 by Rosen. In Rosen, the Court upheld the refusal to disqualify a government witness on the basis of a prior forgery conviction. Id.
39
See, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876); McVeigh v. United States, 78
U.S. (1 Wall.) 259 (1871).
40
267 U.S. 517 (1925).
41
Id. at 532–34, 540.
42
Id. at 537–38.
43
Id. at 532.
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44

violated. The Court recognized a defense right “to call witnesses to
give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or
in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be
45
46
imposed.” Similarly, in In Re Oliver, a state habeas corpus case, the
defendant testified before a special investigatory body and was
47
At a secret contempt trial, the
charged with criminal contempt.
judge, sitting as the fact finder, found that the defendant’s grand jury
testimony lacked credibility and convicted and sentenced the defen48
dant for contempt. The Court found a violation of the defendant’s
right to a public trial and to Fourteenth Amendment due process of
law because he was not given “a reasonable opportunity to defend
49
himself . . . .”
The 1960s saw the beginning of the Supreme Court’s modern
jurisprudence on the right to present a defense. In a series of five
50
cases culminating with Holmes v. South Carolina in 2006, the Court
articulated a constitutional right to present a defense that can be vio51
The right is
lated where the defense is only partially excluded.
based on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process as well as the
Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and confrontation.
52
First, in 1961, in Ferguson v. Georgia, the defendant was prohibited by a state disqualification statute from testifying in his own defense and was permitted only to give an unsworn narrative. Consistent with its practice of deciding cases based on enumerated
constitutional rights where possible, the Court held that the state rule
violated the defendant’s right to counsel, a right that had already
been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
53
Amendment’s due process clause. Concurring in the reversal, Jus44

Id. at 537.
Id.
46
333 U.S. 257 (1948).
47
Id. at 258–59.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 273.
50
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
51
Id. at 330–31.
52
365 U.S. 570 (1961). The statute at issue in the case was part of a larger statutory scheme that declared a criminal defendant incompetent to testify. Id. at 570–71.
53
In fact, however, as Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion notes, Ferguson
was “not a right-to-counsel case.” Id. at 599 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). “It is formalism run riot to find that the division into two separate sections of what is organically inseparable may not for reviewing purpose be treated as a single, appealable
unit. This Court, of course, determines the scope of its reviewing power over a state
court judgment.” Id. at 600. Counsel assisted the defendant at every turn, and he
would have said the same thing even if he had been questioned by his lawyer; the
problem was that the statement would have carried greater weight if it had been un45
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tice Frankfurter would have reached the constitutionality of the disqualification statute and would have held the state statute unconstitu54
tional. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Clark would also
55
have held the statute to be a violation of due process.
56
Next, in Washington v. Texas, the Court expressly recognized a
fundamental right to obtain and present witnesses under the Compulsory Process Clause and held that the Sixth Amendment right was
57
incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, as it had in Rosen, the Court struck down a state statute that de58
clared accomplices incompetent to testify. The Court clearly identified a constitutional “right to present a defense” based on the com59
pulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment. Interpreting that
right, the Court held that the Texas disqualification rule violated the
compulsory process clause because it was arbitrary, i.e., because it was
based on “a priori categories that presumed [the witnesses] unworthy
of belief . . . without any individual showing that they were untrustder oath. Justice Clark, joined by Justice Frankfurter, would have held that the incompetence statute violated due process. Id. at 601 (Clark, J. concurring). The basis
of the decision reflects the fact that the compulsory process clause was not yet binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, while the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had already been incorporated. See id.; Nagareda, supra note 27, at
1076 nn.41–44.
54
Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 600–01 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 602 (Clark, J., concurring).
56
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
57
Id. at 19.
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense,
the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the
prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as
an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the
purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense.
Id.
58
Id. at 23–24. In doing so, the Court expanded the compulsory process clause
to require the actual admission of evidence—the right to put witnesses on the
stand—rather than simply a right to a procedure to compel the attendance of witnesses. The Court observed that it would be odd “to commit the futile act of giving
to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he
had no right to use.” Id. at 22–23. Commentators agree. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 132 (1997) (“[I]f the
accused, in order to show his innocence, is generally empowered to drag a human
being, against her will, into the courtroom to tell the truth, surely he must also enjoy
the lesser-included rights to present other truthful evidence that in no way infringes
on another human being’s autonomy. These lesser-included rights are plainly presupposed by the compulsory process clause.”). See also Nagareda, supra note 27, at
1074.
59
Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
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worthy, or that the jury was incapable of properly evaluating their tes60
timony,” and because it “arbitrarily denied [the defendant] the
right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally
capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and
whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the de61
fense.” The Court also condemned the rule as disproportionate to
the purpose it was designed to serve—to exclude false testimony—
because that interest could have been satisfied simply by leaving ques62
tions of weight and credibility to the jury. The Court also noted the
inherent unfairness of a rule that allowed the prosecution to use the
testimony of an accomplice but that prohibited the defendant’s use
63
of the testimony.
64
Next, in Crane v. Kentucky, the Court reversed a conviction
where the defendant was prohibited from presenting evidence estab65
lishing that his confession was involuntary. The trial court found
the confession voluntary after a hearing and later at trial precluded
the defendant from presenting evidence of the circumstances under
66
which it was made. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
circumstances of the confession were relevant to its reliability and
that the preclusion violated the defendant’s right to “a fair opportu67
nity to present a defense.” Significantly, the Court in Crane identified several sources of the right to present a defense: the due process,
68
compulsory process, and confrontation clauses.
Applying the balancing-of-interests test articulated in Washington,
the Court found the exclusion of evidence of involuntariness to be
unconstitutional. Indeed, in language extremely relevant to the not
yet recognized wrong-person defense, the Court explained that
“[s]tripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances
60

Westen, supra note 22, at 113.
Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
62
Id. at 22 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
63
Id.
64
476 U.S. 683 (1986).
65
See id. at 683.
66
Id. at 684.
67
Id. at 687. “In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind
of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’” Id.
at 690–91 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
68
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, or in the Compulsory Process or confrontation
clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.Id. at 690 (citing California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
61
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that prompted his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled
from answering the one question every rational juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit his
69
guilt?” The Court recognized that judges have broad discretion to
exclude evidence that poses a risk of confusion, prejudice, or harassment, but concluded that exclusion of this evidence violated due
70
process of law.
71
Rock v. Arkansas was decided next. In Rock, the Court recognized a defendant’s right to testify as part of the right to present a
72
complete defense. Accordingly, it struck down a state’s per se ban
73
Alon the admission of post-hypnotically refreshed testimony.
though the defendant testified and offered other evidence, the trial
court refused to permit her to give hypnotically-refreshed testimony,
74
and she was subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the statutory per se ban violated the defendant’s right to
testify. It found that right, once again, in the due process clause and
in the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment, but also as
a corollary to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled
75
testimony.
The Court again relied on the Washington balancing test, under
which evidentiary restrictions on a defendant’s right to present a defense may be sustained only if the restrictions are not “arbitrary or
76
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Applying this standard, the Court held that the per se ban was disproportionate to the interest in reliable testimony because there were
less restrictive yet sufficient means for the jury to evaluate the reliability of the defendant’s hypnotically refreshed testimony (e.g., tapes of
the hypnosis sessions, cross-examination of the examiner and of the
69

Id. at 689.
Crane, 476 U.S. at 690.
71
483 U.S. 44 (1987).
72
Id. at 49.
73
Id. at 56. The defendant had been charged with murdering her husband. She
claimed that the killing was an accident; interviewed by the police at the scene, she
stated that it occurred accidentally, during a scuffle over a gun after her husband
had beaten her. Her memory of the event was incomplete. After two hypnosis sessions, she recalled that he had not had her finger on the trigger when the gun had
fired but that the gun had discharged accidentally after her husband had grabbed
her arm. This accidental firing was corroborated by a firearms expert who testified
that the gun was defective and capable of firing without the trigger being pulled. Id.
at 45–47.
74
Id. at 47.
75
Id. at 62.
76
Id. at 55–56.
70
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defendant), as well as evidence to corroborate it. The per se exclusion was arbitrary because it was disproportionate to the state’s inter77
est in reliable proof.
78
Lastly, in United States v. Scheffer, the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of the army’s per se ban against the admission of
polygraph evidence. Here, however, the Court upheld the ban. In
Scheffer, the defendant was convicted by court martial of various
crimes, including wrongfully using methamphetamine. He had been
working undercover for the army, and his defense was “innocent ingestion”—that he had used the drugs to further his undercover inves79
tigation. He testified on his own behalf but was prohibited from in80
troducing polygraph evidence.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed. The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals and
upheld the exclusion. The Court reasoned that there was no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable and that the per se ban was a
“rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest
81
in barring unreliable evidence.”
III. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A WRONG-PERSON DEFENSE
The constitutional right to present a wrong-person defense has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in two opinions: Chambers v.
82
83
Mississippi and Holmes v. South Carolina.
In Chambers, the defendant was charged with murdering a police
84
officer. His defense had two parts. The first was that he had not
77

Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.
523 U.S. 303 (1998).
79
Id. at 306.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 312. In Scheffer, the majority held that the Rock, Washington, and Chambers
precedents did not support the right to introduce polygraph evidence because,
unlike those cases, the exclusion of the polygraph evidence did not “implicate any
significant interest of the accused.” Id. at 316–17. In Scheffer, unlike in Rock, the defendant fully presented his testimony and no eyewitness was prohibited from testifying. In fact, Scheffer had not been barred from eliciting any substantive proof: he
had been prevented only from eliciting testimony to bolster his credibility. Id. at 317.
Justice Stevens dissented. He would have held that a rule barring a defendant “from
introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility” impairs the
meaningful opportunity to present a defense. Id. at 331–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The evidence was not otherwise available, strongly supported his defense, and its exclusion may have affected the outcome. Accordingly, it unquestionably infringed an
important interest of the accused, which Justice Stevens believed had been undervalued by the Court. Id.
82
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
83
547 U.S. 319 (2006).
78
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been the shooter. Only one officer testified that he saw Chambers
86
fire the fatal shots. No weapon was recovered, and there was no
87
proof that Chambers ever owned the weapon. Moreover, although
three officers testified that they saw the deceased shoot at Chambers,
88
none of them examined Chambers to see if he was alive or armed.
One witness who was standing near the shooting and looking at
Chambers said that he was sure that Chambers had not fired the
89
shots.
Chambers’ second defense was that one McDonald was the
90
shooter—a wrong-person defense. McDonald had confessed to the
murder on four separate occasions; once to Chambers’ counsel and
91
to three different friends. One witness to the shooting said he saw
McDonald shoot the officer, and the deceased’s cousin testified that
92
he saw McDonald with a pistol after the shooting. McDonald was
charged with murder, but when he repudiated his confession to
93
counsel at a preliminary hearing, he was released.
At trial, after the state failed to put McDonald on the stand,
Chambers called him as a witness in an attempt to introduce his con94
95
fessions. McDonald repudiated them on the witness stand. Chambers was not permitted to cross-examine him as an adverse witness
based on Mississippi’s voucher rule, which prevented parties from
96
impeaching their own witnesses.
Chambers then attempted to introduce McDonald’s confessions
97
by calling the three people to whom he had confessed. Each of
them was a close friend of McDonald, and other evidence corrobo98
rated their testimony. The trial court sustained the State’s objection
to these statements because the state hearsay rule did not include an

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 288–89.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id.
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 291–92.
Id. at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
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99

exception for statements against penal interest. The state supreme
100
court affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding a vio101
lation of due process of law.
First, it recognized that “[f]ew rights
are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in
102
his own defense.”
The Court held that, in combination, the strict
application of the state voucher rule and the refusal to allow the defense to elicit evidence that another person had repeatedly confessed
103
Here,
to the crime violated the defendant’s due process rights.
where “the testimony rejected by the trial court . . . bore persuasive
104
assurances of trustworthiness” and “was critical to Chambers’ de105
fense,” its exclusion deprived Chambers of his rights “to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations” and “to present
106
witnesses in his own behalf.”
However, in reversing, the Court attempted to limit the precedential effect of its ruling:
In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in
the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establish99

Id.
Id.
101
Id. at 302.
102
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
103
Id. at 294, 302.
104
Id. at 302. Each of the “confessions was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder”; each was corroborated by other evidence (another confession, an eyewitness, testimony that McDonald had a gun immediately
after the shooting, prior ownership of a .22 caliber revolver, a statement after one
confession that his friend not “mess him up,” and subsequent purchase of a new
weapon); and the statement was manifestly against interest. Id. at 300–01. Moreover,
McDonald was present in the courtroom and “could have been cross-examined by
the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed by the jury.” Id.
105
Id. at 302. Chambers presented eyewitness testimony that he was not the
shooter. Id. at 289. Still, the Court held that the excluded evidence was “critical to
[his] defense.” Id. at 302.
Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of McDonald’s
story by introducing admissible testimony from other sources indicating that he had not been seen in the cafe where he said he was when
the shooting started, that he had not been having beer with Turner,
and that he possessed a .22 pistol at the time of the crime. But all that
remained from McDonald’s own testimony was a single written confession countered by an arguably acceptable renunciation. Chambers’ defense was far less persuasive than it might have been had he been given
an opportunity to subject McDonald’s statements to cross-examination
or had the other confessions been admitted.
Id. at 294.
106
Id.
100
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ment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and
procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts
and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court de107
prived Chambers of a fair trial.
108

In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Holmes v. South Carolina.
That decision, like Chambers, recognized a constitutional right to pre109
sent a wrong-person defense.
In that case, the defendant was con110
victed of murder and other offenses.
Like the defendant in Chambers, he had a two-pronged defense: first, that he was not guilty, and
111
second, that someone else committed the crime.
112
At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on forensic proof.
As
the first prong of his defense, Holmes introduced expert testimony to
show that the forensic evidence had been contaminated and that the
113
For the second prong of his defense,
police had framed him.
Holmes proferred evidence that one Jimmy McCaw White had com114
mitted the murder.
White had been in the victim’s neighborhood
at the time of the assault and had confessed and acknowledged
115
However, at a pre-trial
Holmes’s innocence four different times.
hearing White provided an alibi and, like McDonald in Chambers, de116
nied making incriminating statements.
The trial court excluded
117
It first held, based on state court
the evidence of White’s guilt.
118
precedent, that the third-party guilt evidence was inadmissible because it did not “raise a reasonable inference . . . as to [the defen119
The State Supreme Court affirmed, but
dant’s] own innocence.”
articulated a more specific, different rule. It held that ‘where there
is strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt, especially where there is
strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third party’s

107

Id. at 302–03.
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 319. Commentators have noted that the right to compulsory process involves fairness and parity: the right is designed to give the defendant
the same powers to produce evidence as the prosecutor. See AMAR, supra note 58, at
132–34.
109
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331.
110
Id. at 322.
111
Id. at 322–23.
112
Id. at 322.
113
Id. at 322–23.
114
Id. at 323.
115
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 323.
118
Id. at 323–24 (citing State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d. 532, 534 (S.C. 1941)).
119
Id. (quoting Gregory, 16 S.E.2d at 534).
108
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alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to appellant’s
120
own innocence.’”
121
In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed.
First, the Court reiterated the constitutional rule that a state statute
or rule that limits the defendant’s right to present a defense must not
be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to
serve. Applying that standard, the Court held that the defendant’s
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense
was violated by the rule that precluded third-party guilt evidence
where the prosecution introduces “forensic evidence that, if believed,
122
strongly supports a guilty verdict.”
First, the Court held that the trial judge erroneously relied on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence to determine admissibil123
ity.
The Court explained that “by evaluating the strength of only
one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding
the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut
124
or cast doubt.” Thus, the rule was “arbitrary” because it did not ra125
Interestingly,
tionally serve the purpose it was designed to further.
the “purpose” of the rule against the admission of third-party guilt
evidence was not identified. The Court did acknowledge the authority of the courts to exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by the risk of “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
126
potential to mislead the jury.”
Presumably it was these traditional
interests that the rule was designed to protect because the Court indicated that the state had not “identified any other legitimate end
127
Second, the Court held that the ruling was
that the rule serves.”
arbitrary because it permitted the lower court to exclude defense evidence based on a presumption that the prosecution’s proof was
credible and reliable, without any inquiry into the strength of the
128
For these two reasons, the exclusionary rule
prosecution’s proof.
did not serve the legitimate purpose third-party culpability rules are
otherwise designed to serve, i.e., “to focus the trial on the central is-

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 324 (quoting State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004)).
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 321, 331.
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 326.
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 331.
Id. at 329–30.
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sues by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connec129
tion to the central issues.”
The Court gave no meaningful guidance to the lower courts
about the standards that should govern the admissibility of third-party
guilt evidence. Justice Alito expressed no preference for the various
130
approaches taken by the lower courts.
As noted above, the Court
cited opinions from several states that articulated various standards
for excluding third-party guilt evidence when it fails to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, is “so remote and lack[s] such
connection with the crime;” “does not sufficiently connect the other
person to the crime; . . . [or] is speculative or remote or does not
tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant’s
131
It noted that “[s]uch rules are widely accepted, and neither
trial.”
132
The Court did not
petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.”
discuss the application of any of these standards.
In addition, the Court weakened even the precedential value of
its own opinion as a guide to the lower courts by relying on Corpus Ju133
134
ris and American Jurisprudence.
As scholars have noted, these secondary authorities have virtually no weight or persuasive value and
are so general that “lower courts will not adopt quoted material from
such sources” as representing the Supreme Court’s view one way or
135
the other.
IV. THE WRONG-PERSON DEFENSE IN THE LOWER COURTS
As noted above, the Holmes Court explicitly left unchallenged
and unexamined the various state court rules governing admissibility
of third-party guilt evidence, noting that “[s]uch rules are widely ac136
cepted, and neither petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.”
In short, the Supreme Court has left it up to the states. Unfortunately, the states’ treatment of the wrong-person defense is utterly
chaotic; the states have no coherent test for protecting the right to

129

Id. at 330.
Id. at 327.
131
Id. at 327 (internal citations omitted).
132
Id.
133
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327–28 (citing State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534–35 (S.C.
1941)).
134
Id.
135
Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy: Advanced Workshop Third Party
Culpability Evidence; Holmes v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___ , 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164
L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), and More, 43 No. 1 CRIM. LAW BULL. 1, 109 (Jan.–Feb. 2007).
136
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327.
130
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137

present this defense.
Not surprisingly, the decisions yield unpredictable results. Indeed, the standards for admissibility are even articulated in many different and confusing ways. Some courts apply
138
139
the narrow “direct connection,” or clear nexus test; others ask
whether the evidence has a “legitimate tendency” to prove someone
else committed the crime, which frequently requires a direct connec140
Other courts ask whether the evidence is sufficient to raise a
tion.
141
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt or has a “legitimate
142
tendency” to do so; others employ a probative value versus preju143
dice balancing test.
Under that test, the alleged “prejudice” is not
the traditional notion of prejudice. Rather, the prejudice is claimed
to result from disruption of the trial with an allegedly collateral issue
144
or from forcing the prosecution to meet the additional proof.
145
AdMoreover, some courts alternate between these different tests.
ditionally, the courts address the issue not as a constitutional matter
146
but as a garden-variety issue of evidentiary admissibility. On appeal,
virtually all of the courts review a judge’s exclusion of third-party guilt
evidence under the broad abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings rather than under the more exacting standard of review
147
for constitutional violations.
What the lower courts really appear to be doing is excluding
third-party guilt evidence where they do not believe that the prosecution has the wrong person. Rather than focusing on the overall proof
that the defendant may not be the person who committed the crime
(both the first and second parts of the wrong-person defense), courts
focus solely on the second part (the piece or pieces of evidence
148
sought to be offered against the third party). This treatment is not
consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis of the issue in Chambers
and Holmes, or with the Court’s long-standing protection of the right
to present a complete defense in general; nor is this approach the
137

McCord, supra note 4, at 938.
See infra notes 164–82 and accompanying text.
139
See McCord, supra note 4, at 938–42.
140
See infra notes 198–208 and accompanying text.
141
See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
142
See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.
143
See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text.
144
See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text.
145
See, e.g., People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 101 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); see also State v.
Cotto, 865 A.2d 660, 669 (N.J. 2005).
146
See infra notes 209–22 and accompanying text.
147
See infra notes 190–99 and accompanying text.
148
See infra notes 164–222 and accompanying text.
138
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best way to protect the Court’s concern about reliability. By attempting to articulate standards of admissibility for only part of the defense
rather than balancing prosecution and defense interests in the defense of innocence as a whole and fashioning an appropriate constitutional balancing test for that defense, the lower courts have ended
up with no coherent rules at all.
The most exacting state standard of admissibility for third-party
guilt evidence requires proof of a “direct connection” or “direct link”
149
between the third party and the crime charged.
Under that standard, evidence that a third party may be guilty of the charged crime is
inadmissible, regardless of the other proof, unless the defense produces evidence “to directly connect [the] third person to the crime
150
In applying this standard, the courts analyze only the
charged.”
proffered evidence; they do not look at the rest of the proof or
whether the first part of the wrong-person defense has been estab151
That is, there is no evaluation of whether there is a threshlished.
old credible basis to believe the defendant may not have committed
the crime.
152
For example, in State v. Grega, the defendant was convicted of
anal rape and murder of his wife in a vacation condominium. The
evidence against him was circumstantial and not very strong. There
were no eyewitnesses and no forensic proof to identify him as the killer. He reported the death, was extremely upset when the police arrived, consented to a search, and voluntarily gave several statements
153
Those statements revealed some inconsistencies.
to the police.
There was evidence that supported the inference that the condominium had been wiped down, and clothing found in the laundry ma154
Paper
chine contained some blood that could not be identified.
towels stained with blood were found in a common trash receptacle
in a garbage bag that contained the defendant’s fingerprints, a toilet
was stopped up by a wad of paper towels, and a box of Marlboro ciga155
rettes were found stuck to the inside of the toilet.
The defendant
claimed he had been out with his son and returned to find his wife
156
dead.
149

See generally McCord, supra note 4, at 920–38.
State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445, 454 (Vt. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Gilman, 608 A.2d 660, 663 (Vt. 1992)).
151
Id.
152
721 A.2d 445 (1998).
153
Id. at 449.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 449–50.
150
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There was evidence concerning two painters who were present at
the condominium development where the deceased was raped and
157
killed.
Both had given false addresses to the police, both were incarcerated for other crimes at the time of the trial, and both testified
158
as prosecution witnesses. One of them had lied to the police about
when he arrived home the night of the murder and admitted buying
159
Marlboro cigarettes.
The other admitted that he had joked about
160
The defendant proffered additional evidence rekilling a woman.
lating to their sexual practices, history of assaults, threatening behav161
ior, and theft.
That evidence was excluded as insufficiently linked
162
In addition, a statement by one of them claiming reto the crime.
163
sponsibility for the crime was excluded as hearsay. The court found
no deprivation of the right to present a defense largely because of the
164
absence of a “direct link” to the actual crimes.
It made no reference to whether there was a credible basis to believe that someone
other than the defendant had committed the crimes.
Under the same standard, in State v. West, evidence of latent,
unidentified fingerprints found at the murder scene was deemed inadmissible where there was no explanation for the prints, when they
165
Similarly, in Klinect v. State, eviwere left, or who had left them.
dence that a testifying accomplice who had been present at the scene
had a violent disposition was excluded because it did not “connect
[him] with the corpus delicti, or show that [he had] recently commit166
ted a crime of the same or similar nature.”
A second standard articulated by the state courts asks whether
the proffered evidence is “capable of raising a reasonable doubt” as
167
to a defendant’s guilt. That analysis was used in State v. Cotto, where
the defendant was charged with robbery and related offenses. The
168
defendant presented an alibi defense.
He also offered evidence to
show that a fellow inmate, a relative of the victims, identified two
other people including the victim’s cousin, as having planned a simi157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 453.
Grega, 721 A.2d at 453.
Id. at 453–54.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 455.
Grega, 721 A.2d at 456.
State v. West, 877 A.2d 787 (Conn. 2005).
Klinect v. State, 501 S.E.2d 810, 814 (Ga. 1998).
865 A.2d 660 (N.J. 2005).
Id. at 666.
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lar robbery, the inference being that they committed the charged
169
That witness repeated the inrobbery instead of the defendant.
formation to the defendant’s investigator but refused to testify at
170
trial. At trial, the defendant was identified by the victim, his former
171
girlfriend, who also had identified him immediately after the crime.
The trial court denied the defendant’s proffer because, according to the court, the evidence that others had planned a similar robbery had no “rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with
172
respect to an essential feature of the State’s case.” Like many other
courts, although it used the reasonable doubt standard, this court ultimately balanced prejudice versus probative value, holding that the
proffered evidence was “so speculative and . . . full of conjecture and
hearsay . . . [that] the prejudicial value . . . outweigh[ed] the proba173
tive value.” The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s exclusion
of the evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and held that
174
the trial court had not abused its discretion.
Similarly, in People v. Valencia, the court excluded third-party
guilt evidence of motive and opportunity on the ground that the
175
third-party guilt evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt. In Valencia, the court looked only at the evidence sought to be admitted to
determine whether that evidence alone raised a reasonable doubt; it
did not evaluate whether the proffered evidence, together with the
other proof, raised a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.
In Valencia, the defendant was convicted of child endangerment
176
and inflicting corporal punishment on a child.
He proffered evi177
The evidence that another person, E., had caused her injuries.
dence would have shown that E. had lived with the child, had struck
the child as well as another child, had a short temper with children,
and had admitted being forced to leave the defendant’s home because the defendant thought she had acted inappropriately toward

169

Id. at 669.
Id.
171
Id. at 666.
172
Id. at 669 (citing State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974, 1003 (N.J. 2004)); see also State v.
Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 977 (N.J. 1988); State v. Fulston, 738 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
173
Cotto, 865 A.2d at 669.
174
Id. at 670.
175
People v. Valencia, No. C048420, 2006 WL 1545558 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d June 7,
2006).
176
Id. at *1.
177
Id. at *4.
170
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178

the children.
In addition, the evidence showed that the defendant
had the “narrowest window [of opportunity to injure the child] than
a number of people, but in particular, [a narrower opportunity than
179
The trial court excluded the third-party guilt evidence as
E.].”
showing “no more than ‘perhaps an opportunity’ for E.” to have
180
The appellate court reviewed the ruling
committed the crimes.
under the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed. Mixing at least
two standards of admissibility, the court held that “[n]one of this evidence or speculation raised a reasonable doubt as to [the defendant’s] guilt” and that the evidence had “no tendency in reason to
181
prove any material point and is thus irrelevant.”
A third test used by the courts asks whether the proffered evidence has a “legitimate tendency” to prove that a third party commit182
ted the crime.
For example, in State v. Denny, evidence that any of
several third parties had motives to commit the crime as well as
183
criminal dispositions was excluded.
Again, although it articulated
the standard as “legitimate tendency,” the court also excluded the
evidence because it did not show “a direct connection between the
184
[third party] and the crime.”
Hawaii also used the “legitimate tendency” test in State v. Rabel185
186
lizsa.
In Rabellizsa, the defendant was convicted of murder.
The
evidence included the testimony of one Mark Paishon that two days
178

Id.
Id. at *5.
180
Id.
181
Valencia, 2006 WL 1545558 at *5. See also People v. Guillen, No. B188362, 2006
WL 3262343 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Nov. 13, 2006). In Guillen, the defendant was convicted of possessing various drugs found in his office, car, and trailer. Id. at *1. He
sought to present evidence that any one of three men might have placed the drugs in
these locations to frame him. Id. at *2. Two of the three had motive and opportunity to commit the crimes, and one of them had previously tried to frame the defendant with a false charge of kidnapping. Id. The court held that the evidence was
properly excluded because there was “no direct or circumstantial evidence to link
any one of these men to the crime.” Id. Even though one of the men had previously
tried to frame the defendant, the evidence was deemed short of connecting that person to the crime charged. Id. at *3.
182
See Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the “Legitimate Tendency” Standard of Admissibility (and Doesn’t Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2001).
183
State v. Denny, 357 N.W.2d 12, 18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
184
Id. at 17.
185
State v. Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d 43, 47 (Haw. 1995). Again, however, the court defined the “legitimate tendency” test as relevance, i.e., that “‘relevant evidence means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . more or less probable.’” Id. (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401 (LexisNexis 2008)) (emphasis in
original).
186
Id. at 48.
179
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before the victim’s death the victim sped down Paishon’s street nearly
hitting some children, and that Paishon’s girlfriend and the defen187
dant’s mother were upset by the incident. There was evidence that
the victim was screaming at Paishon after he “had told the victim not
188
to speed . . . because ‘a lot of kids [were] there.’”
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing; however, prosecution
witnesses identified the defendant’s car near the scene and leaving
the scene of the murder, and a long-time friend of the defendant saw
the defendant with a gun at a different location immediately after the
189
shooting.
Moreover, as the victim died, he said to his friend Joe,
190
The defendant intended to proffer
“Joe, Rabellizsa I gonna die.”
evidence that the victim had threatened Paishon and “ran him off the
road while driving a car,” allegedly giving Paishon a motive to kill the
191
Again, the court combined admissibility standards: alvictim.
though it articulated a “legitimate tendency” standard, it held that
the evidence of third-party motive was inadmissible because there was
no direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the
192
actual perpetration of the crime.
Many courts have now moved away from the more rigid standards and treat third-party guilt evidence under the traditional rele193
vance standard.
If the evidence is deemed relevant, its probative
187

Id. at 44.
Id. (alteration in original).
189
Id. at 45.
190
Id. at 44.
191
Rabellizsa, 903 P.2d at 44.
192
Id. at 47.
193
See, e.g., People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2001). There, the defendant
was charged with attempted murder based on a shooting. Id. at 165. He tried to introduce evidence that the gun used in the shooting had been used two months later
by a third party who had been present at the shooting. Id. The victim identified the
defendant as the shooter. Id. at 166. The defendant admitted that he and the victim
were arguing, but he claimed that the victim knocked him down. Id. After that, the
defendant heard gunshots but did not know who fired the gun or that the victim had
been wounded. Id. The principal issue at trial was whether the defendant was the
shooter. Id.
Prior to trial, the prosecution produced a ballistics report that linked the gun
used in the shooting to a crime two months later committed by one Maurice Booker.
Id. Two prosecution witnesses placed Booker at the scene. Id. Nevertheless, the trial
court refused to admit the ballistics report into evidence “stating that ‘there [was]
not evidence-in-chief before this jury placing Mr. Booker inside [the deli] or even
outside [the deli] at a time that’s relevant.’” Id. (alteration in original). The defendant was convicted of attempted murder. Id. The Appellate Division affirmed on the
ground that “the defense had ‘failed to show a clear link between the third party and
the crime in question.’” Id. (quoting People v. Primo, 704 N.Y.S.2d 112, 112 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2000)).
188

GRIFFIN (FINAL)

152

1/28/2009 11:08:31 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:129

value is balanced against the risk of undue prejudice, jury confusion,
194
Under this test, too, the courts’
or waste of judicial resources.
analysis is myopic. For example, in State v. Larson the defendant was
195
found guilty of murder based on a drive-by shooting.
There was
credible evidence showing that he was not the shooter: he was not
identified as being involved in the shooting and none of the fingerprints or molds of foot prints or tire prints were connected to either
196
the defendant or those who were with him that evening. Moreover,
the state’s theory “would have required the defendant to drive an av197
erage speed of somewhere between 95 and 370 miles per hour.” As
for the prosecution’s case, it was entirely circumstantial. The shotgun
used was linked to shotgun shells found near a car the defendant was
identified as having been in earlier that evening; he was identified as
being in that car by a woman driving by in another car at the same
time—she helped the police make a composite sketch of the person
198
she had seen in the car. The witness did not identify the defendant
199
as the driver until the trial. In addition, there was evidence that the
defendant’s car was capable of driving over one hundred miles per
200
hour and that he drove like a race car driver when drinking.
As the court noted, drive-by shootings are rare in South Da201
kota.
Nevertheless, at trial, the defendant proffered evidence of
two other drive-by shootings that night with which he was not even
202
The court refused to admit this evialleged to have been involved.

The Court of Appeals reversed, discarding the “clear link” standard in favor of a
simple relevance standard. Id. at 167. Under that standard, “evidence is relevant if it
tends to prove the existence or non-existence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly in
issue in the case.” Id.
Noting that the ballistics report was relevant evidence, and that there was proof
that Booker was at the scene, the court held “its probative value plainly outweigh[ed]
the dangers of delay, prejudice and confusion.” Id. at 169. Significantly, the court
relied in part on the fact that the evidence was relevant to the identity of the shooter,
which the defendant placed at issue by admitting his presence at the scene and
claiming that he heard a gun shot but did not know from where it had come. Id.
194
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403.
195
State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 1994).
196
Id. at 734–35.
197
Id. at 736.
198
Id. at 735.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 736.
201
Larson, 512 N.W.2d at 739.
202
Id. The proof the defendant intended to present included evidence that on
the evening of the killing, a shot was allegedly fired at a vehicle and marks were
found that could have been caused by a shotgun. Id. Additionally, later the same
night, a witness heard a shotgun blast from a van. Id.
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203

dence, and the appellate court affirmed.
In excluding the evidence, the court did not look at both parts of the wrong-person defense because it did not evaluate whether the defendant had made a
204
Instead, the
credible showing that he had not been the shooter.
court held that the probative value of the evidence of the two other
drive-by shootings – on its own - did not overcome the state’s inter205
ests in reliability and in “promoting orderly and efficient trials.”
That is, the admission of the evidence would disrupt the trial with a
collateral issue and require the prosecution to meet it. Accordingly,
the state appellate court held that the evidence was properly ex206
cluded.
203

Id. at 740.
Id. at 739–40.
205
Id. at 740.
206
The federal courts similarly analyze the admissibility of third-party perpetrator
evidence under the relevance standard of Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and then employ the prejudice versus probative value balancing test of Rule 403.
Again, this approach applies the same misleading focus on only half of the defense—
the degree of nexus between the third-party guilt evidence and the crime and then
on the claimed disruption of the trial and prejudice to the government. FED. R. EVID.
401, 403.
A recent example is United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). In Jordan, the defendant was charged with killing a fellow inmate. Id. at 1216. He sought
to show that another inmate had been the killer. Id. at 1218. Relying on Holmes, the
Tenth Circuit reiterated that although the bar for admission of evidence under Rule
401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is low, the trial courts have discretion to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 “‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.’” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403). Under this standard, the court of appeals explained that district courts may deny admission of third-party guilt evidence if it “fails
to establish, either on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, a
non-speculative ‘nexus’ between the crime charged and the alleged perpetrator.” Id.
at 1219.
In contrast, in Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for first degree murder on
the ground, inter alia, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a third
party had a motive to kill the victim and had recently tried to do so. Id. at 3, 6. The
Court of Appeals rejected the “clearly linked” phraseology and adopted the traditional relevance standard. Id. at 3. It qualified that standard, however, as “evidence
of motivation of a third party to commit the crime charged risks distracting the jury
from the issue of this defendant’s guilt or innocence, and in applying the relevance
standard the judge may properly take account of that danger.” Id.
In Winfield, the government presented identification evidence from three eyewitnesses that the defendant had chased down and shot one Deborah Davis. Id.
However, there was no evidence of a motive for the killing. Id. The defense sought
to prove that Davis was one of three people who committed an armed robbery, that
she had agreed to help the prosecution in the case against the other two perpetrators, and that one of the other participants killed her to silence her. Id. In fact, the
third party had tried to kill her once before, and when she was finally gunned down,
her assailant said “You won’t tell this.” Id. On the other hand, a photograph of the
204
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V. A COHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
When it articulated the right to present a defense, the Supreme
Court found that right in both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the Sixth Amendment right to compul207
sory process.
Later, as the issue of incorporation arose, the Court
held that the right was incorporated through the Fourteenth
208
Ultimately, in
Amendment as a component of due process of law.
Holmes, the Court ruled that whether it is located in the confrontation
or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment or directly in
the due process clause, the right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” clearly exists and prohibits arbitrary or dis-

alleged third-party killer had been placed in a photo array and none of the witnesses
identified him as the killer. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
The trial court excluded the evidence that someone else had killed Davis because the third party had not been identified or placed at the scene, there was no
proof that the third party knew where Davis could be located, and there was no proof
that the third party knew that the victim had testified in the grand jury the day she
was killed. Id. Interestingly, the trial judge noted “[t]he inherent ambiguity of this evidence supposedly linking [the third party] to the murder would not . . . tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant who was apparently known by many of the
eyewitnesses did not commit the offense.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Sitting en banc, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. Id. at 7. It held that the standard applicable to third-party guilt evidence is the
same as that applicable to other evidence, i.e., that evidence is admissible if it will
“tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant
committed the charged offense.” Id. at 4–5 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 552
A.2d 513, 516 (D.C. 1989)). Once the evidence is deemed relevant, a trial “judge
must also balance the probative value of the evidence ‘against the risk of prejudicial
impact.’” Id. at 5 (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C. 1977)).
The trial judge may exclude marginally relevant evidence that risks confusion that
may be exacerbated if the government asserts the need to present rebuttal proof. Id.
The judge has wide latitude to limit the extent of such testimony. Id. However, in
this case, the evidence of the third party’s motive, the prior attempt to kill the witness, the fact that the witness was killed on the same day she testified in the grand
jury, and that the killer had said something about “snitching” when he shot her was
highly probative, even in the absence of evidence that the third party had been at the
scene. Id. at 6. Reversing, the court explained that “a substantial proffer that a third
party committed the offense implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to ‘a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Id. at 6–7 (quoting Crane
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). Moreover, evidence of similar “recent assaults against the victim stemming from identical motivation” was deemed highly
probative. Id. at 7.
207
See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961) (finding the right to have
defendant’s counsel question defendant to elicit his statement is protected by the
Due Process Clause); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (finding that a defendant “has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.”).
208
Washington, 388 U.S. at 17–19.
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proportionate limits on a defendant’s right to present evidence. As
the Supreme Court has stated, there are “[f]ew rights . . . more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own de210
fense.”
The lower courts’ treatment of the wrong-person defense does
not protect the defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete
defense and it does not adequately protect the states’ interests in reliability and efficiency. The courts’ difficulty in articulating a coherent
analysis of the wrong-person defense may be the result of the uniqueness of the defense because it is a two-prong defense—i.e., “I didn’t
do it and here’s who did.” Without a threshold examination of the
evidence as a whole, and therefore stripped of its context, the lower
courts almost inevitably conclude that any individual piece of evidence that someone else might be the criminal is collateral or will
211
disrupt the trial.
Only by employing an analysis that addresses the
two-pronged nature of the defense can courts adequately and fairly
protect the right to present it. That treatment would also be consistent with the analysis the Court used throughout its more general
212
right to present a defense jurisprudence.
Accordingly, the trial courts should treat the wrong-person defense under the following analysis: first, a threshold determination
should be made as to whether the defendant has raised a credible basis to believe that he did not commit the crime. If that threshold is
met, the defendant’s third-party guilt evidence should be admitted
under the constitutional balancing test prescribed by the Supreme
Court. That test balances the government’s interest in reliable proof
213
and orderly procedure against the defendant’s right to present a
214
Once the defendant has made a credible showcomplete defense.
ing that he is not the person who committed the crime, the defendant’s interest should outweigh any government interest in excluding
third-party guilt evidence and there should be a presumption in favor
of its admissibility.

209

Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane, 476 U.S. at

690).
210

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., supra notes 166–178 and accompanying text.
212
See, e.g., supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
213
State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 740 (S.D. 1994).
214
Once the government’s interest in excluding the evidence is identified, the individual’s “competing interest must be closely examined.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 67 (1996) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295).
211
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A. The Government’s Interest
The prosecution has no legitimate interest in convicting an innocent person. Moreover, while the state has an interest in reliable
proof that may support state evidentiary rules, those rules are unconstitutionally arbitrary and disproportionate when, as in Crane and
215
Rock, they exclude otherwise reliable evidence. The interest in reliable proof that allegedly requires the exclusion of third-party guilt
evidence is surely at its lowest where there is a credible showing that
the defendant did not commit the crime.
Moreover, the courts’ focus on the probative value of proffered
evidence is not the most logical way to protect states’ interest in reliable proof. As noted above, the third-party guilt defense is different
from other defenses because the defendant rarely has the resources
to “make a case” against someone else. He may be able to elicit some
sort of proof, but, as the cases show, that proof is rarely going to be
sufficiently probative to establish anyone else’s direct connection to
the crime. It may include motive, opportunity, criminal disposition,
or other pieces of proof, but it is unlikely to be complete. On the
other hand, the defense does have the ability to raise a credible claim
that the defendant did not commit the crime, either through crossexamination of identification witnesses, expert testimony, or evidence. A reliable basis for concluding that the defendant may not
have committed the crime is a better way to protect the prosecution
from unreliable proof that someone else did it. The focus on that
showing is the most fair and logical way to protect the state’s interest
in reliability.
Regardless of the test articulated, many courts exclude thirdparty guilt evidence on the ground that it injects collateral issues into
216
the trial or confuses the jury. Where the defense has already raised
a credible basis for believing that the defendant did not commit the
crime, however, that someone else did it simply is not collateral.
Moreover, any concern about jury confusion or alleged risk of speculation is minimized by anchoring the third-party guilt evidence in the
threshold showing that the named defendant is not the right defendant. Once that threshold of proof is there, the jury can evaluate the
215

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (finding the opportunity to be
heard “would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence . . . when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence”); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 66 (1987) (noting that unless the state shows
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always untrustworthy, a state’s per se exclusion of all such evidence is an arbitrary restriction).
216
See supra Part IV.
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third-party guilt evidence in the context of that proof, and specula217
Finally, where the evidence suption thus should be minimized.
ports a credible showing that the prosecution has failed to prove the
defendant is the person who committed the charged crime, the government cannot claim to be unfairly ambushed by proof that someone else committed it.
B. The Defendant’s Interest
In Chambers and Holmes, each of the defendants proffered evi218
dence that showed that he had not committed the charged crime.
In Chambers, only one officer testified that Chambers fired the fatal
219
“Although three officers saw [the deceased officer] shoot
shots.
Chambers . . . none of them examined Chambers to see whether he
220
was still alive” or armed. No gun was found at the scene and “there
221
was no proof that Chambers had ever owned [a gun].” One witness
testified that he was looking at Chambers at the time of the shooting
222
and “was sure that Chambers did not fire the shots.” In Holmes, the
defendant produced an expert witness who undermined the forensic
evidence by criticizing police investigatory procedures, and another
who supported the defendant’s claim that the police planted a palm
223
In these two cases, when the Supreme Court balanced the
print.
interests underlying state evidentiary rules that limited the admission
of third-party guilt evidence against the defendant’s interest in presenting the proof, it invalidated those state evidentiary rules as a vio-

217

In any event, courts are not powerless to assist jurors in evaluating the significance of third-party guilt evidence or of sifting through conflicting identification
proof. First, as courts already do, they can instruct the jurors on the Government’s
burden of proof, on reasonable doubt, and on credibility. See, e.g., 1 LEONARD B.
SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL (2008). N.Y. Criminal
Jury Instructions 2d - Credibility, http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/CJI2d.
credibility.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); N.Y. Criminal Jury Instructions 2d - Reasonable Doubt, http://www.nycourts.gove/cji/1-General/CJI2d.presumption.burden.
reasonable_doubt.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). If the evidence warrants, trial courts
can instruct the jury, in so many words, that mere suspicion or surmise that someone
else might have committed the crime is insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on its
own.
218
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 289 (1973); Holmes v. South Carolina,
547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006) (“[T]he petitioner proffered evidence that, if believed,
squarely proved that [a third party] not petitioner was the perpetrator.”).
219
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 286, 289.
220
Id. at 289.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Holmes, 547 U.S. at 323.
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224

lation of due process.
With the case in that posture, i.e., once the
defendant had created a credible basis to believe he was not the killer, the defendant’s interest in telling the jury who actually committed the crime was deemed by the Court to outweigh the government’s
interests.
This analysis is reflected in the Court’s decisions in its three
general right to present a defense cases. In Rock, Ferguson, and Washington, the defendant produced some evidence tending to prove his
defense but was prevented from presenting that defense com225
pletely. Again, with the cases in that posture, the Court recognized
that the defendant’s interest was at its greatest, that the government’s
interest was small, and that the defendants’ interests in presenting a
226
complete defense thus outweighed the states’ interest in reliability.
The importance of presenting a complete defense is also confirmed by other disciplines. As other scholars have concluded,
“[e]mpirical studies have shown that—more than legal standards,
definitions or instructions—narrative plays a key role in the juror de227
cision-making process.”
Because jurors try to fit evidence into a
228
coherent and complete story, each story must have two characteristics: coverage, or “the extent to which the story accounts for the evidence presented at trial”; and coherence, or “consistency, plausibility
229
“The party who can tell the most compelling
and completeness.”
story which fits best with each individual juror’s own narrative (as
constructed from the trial evidence, background information . . . and
230
Thus,
expectations), will emerge the ultimate winner in the case.”
the defendant’s ability to tell a plausible and complete story about his
own innocence is the right to present a complete defense. If the constitutional right means anything, it means that a defendant who
claims he did not commit the crime has a right to tell the jury who
231
did.

224

Id. at 330–31; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295–98, 302–03.
See supra notes 52, 56, 71 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 52, 56, 71 and accompanying text.
227
John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story, Story: Narrative Relevance, Third
Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 2 (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-042), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=942653.
228
Id. at 27.
229
Id. at 30–31.
230
Id. at 30.
231
See id. at 31 (“Finally, a story is complete when the structure of the story has all
of its parts. Missing information, or lack of plausible inferences about one or more
major components of the story will decrease confidence in the explanation.” (citing
225
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Moreover, the requirement of direct linkage of the third party
under the traditional state tests is fundamentally unfair. As noted
above, one aspect of the uniqueness of the wrong-person defense is
that the defendant rarely has the resources to make a case against
someone else. He may be able to elicit some sort of proof but, as the
cases show, courts rarely consider that proof to be sufficiently probative to establish anyone else’s direct connection to the crime. On the
other hand, through cross-examination of identification witnesses,
expert testimony, or other evidence, the defense has the ability to
raise a credible claim that he did not commit the crime. The focus
on that threshold showing is a fair way to determine whether the second prong of the defense should be analyzed. It is also an effective
way to ensure the reliability of third-party guilt evidence—much more
effective than expecting the defendant, on his own, to show a sufficient nexus to avoid exclusion of the proof. If the defendant is capable of creating through evidence or cross-examination a credible basis for believing he is not the person who committed the crime, such
will be a sufficient protection against the admission of unreliable
proof.
C. Reliance on Eyewitness Identification Evidence
A fortiori where the prosecution relies substantially on eyewitness identification testimony third-party guilt evidence should be admitted. As a category of evidence, eyewitness identification, like ac232
complice testimony, is presumptively unreliable.
Indeed,
unreliable identification evidence has been responsible for more
233
If the prosewrongful convictions than all other causes combined.
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 527 (1991))).
232
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances
of mistaken identification.”).
233
See State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 895 (N.J. 2006) (“Misidentification is widely
recognized as the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.”)
(footnote omitted); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE vii, xiii (1932) (“Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is
an identification of the accused by the victim of a crime of violence. This mistake
was practically alone responsible for twenty-nine of these [sixty-five wrongful] convictions.”) (footnote omitted); JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 73 (2000) (“In a
study of DNA exoneration by the Innocence Project, [eighty-four] percent of the
wrongful convictions rested, at least in part, on mistaken identification by an eyewitness or victim.”); Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the
Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 283–93 (1988) (describing a study
of more than two hundred felony cases of wrongful conviction that found misidenti-
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cution is relying on evidence of dubious reliability, then the state’s
interest in reliability is diminished. Moreover, it is well recognized
that jurors give disproportionate weight to identification testimony—
in fact, jurors give identification evidence more significance than
234
When jurors see a victim point to a defenconfession evidence.
dant, one who has already been selected for prosecution, they believe
235
it.
The Supreme Court held in Crane, in overruling the exclusion
of evidence at trial concerning the circumstances of a defendant’s
confession, that if the defendant was “stripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the
defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one question
every rational juror needs answered. If the defendant is innocent,
236
In an identification case,
why did he previously admit his guilt?”
there is one question every rational juror needs answered; if you say
237
the eyewitness is wrong, who did it? As the Crane Court continued,
“a defendant’s case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the
jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts
238
doubt on its credibility.” Similarly, a defendant’s case may stand or
fall on his ability to tell the jury who committed the crime. The jury
is already being overly influenced on what may well be unreliable
identification evidence. Third-party guilt evidence is meant to correct this imbalance. The need to dispel the jury’s over-reliance on
eyewitness identification testimony adds to the defendant’s interest in
presenting proof of third-party guilt.
In addition, the government’s interest in excluding third-party
guilt evidence where it relies on eyewitness identification is diminished. As commentators have noted,
[M]istaken eyewitness identifications—the most frequent single
cause of wrongful convictions—can convince investigators early in
a case that a particular individual is the perpetrator. Convinced
of guilt, investigators might then set out to obtain a confession
from that suspect, . . . produce a false confession, . . .[and] recruit
or encourage testimony from unreliable jailhouse snitches. . . .
Forensic scientists, aware of the desired result of their analyses,

fication to be the single largest source of error, accounting for more than half of
cases that had one main cause).
234
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1996) (“There is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at
the defendant, and says, ‘That’s the one!’”).
235
Id.
236
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986).
237
Id.
238
Id.
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might be influenced—even unwittingly—to interpret ambiguous
239
data or fabricate results to support the police theory.

In other words, once the prosecution believes it has the right person,
“tunnel vision” sets in and evidence inconsistent with the police the240
ory is not pursued.
Finally, throughout history, a paramount and underlying rationale of the compulsory process clause has been the requirement of
241
parity.
The right to compulsory process was intended to give the
242
defense the same right to present evidence as the prosecution. An
evolved notion of parity would require that if the prosecution is allowed to produce and rely on notoriously unreliable identification
proof, the defense must have an ability to rebut that proof without
243
being subjected to a higher threshold than the prosecution.
D. Review for Constitutional Error
Finally, the claimed deprivation of the right to present a wrongperson defense should be reviewed on appeal de novo. The abuse of
discretion standard used by the state courts simply is not appropriate
244
for review of a constitutional threshold. If a violation is then found,
it should be subjected to constitutional harmless error analysis. If the
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that exclusion of the
defense was harmless because the evidence was cumulative or weak,
245
the conviction will not be reversed.
In making that determination,
246
the appellate court is required to evaluate the record de novo.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right to present a wrong-person defense is not being handled effectively by the lower courts. The Supreme Court has left the
issue entirely up to the states. The states have an illogical, ineffective,
239

See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (2006) (internal footnotes
omitted).
240
Id. at 293 n.15 (“[A]ll that confirms the diagnosis makes a strong imprint on
the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with diverted attention.”) (quoting JOINT CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N & ASS’N OF AM.
LAW SCH., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, in 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958)).
241
See supra notes 24–34 and accompanying text.
242
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
243
See supra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text.
244
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
245
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–24 (1967).
246
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991).
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and disingenuous method of analysis that serves neither the states’
nor the defendants’ interests. The importance of the wrong-person
defense has never been greater, given the unreliability of identification proof and its role in causing wrongful convictions.
Rather than focus solely on the third-party guilt evidence sought
to be introduced—treating the issue as a mere evidentiary ruling—
the courts should recognize the unique two-pronged nature of the
wrong-person defense: “I didn’t do it, and this is who did.” First, the
courts should determine whether the defendant has proffered sufficient evidence that he is not the person who committed the crime.
Second, if that threshold is established, the third-party guilt evidence
should be admitted. That is how the Supreme Court protected the
right to present a wrong-person defense in Chambers and Holmes. This
analysis recognizes the constitutional underpinnings of the right to
make the wrong-person defense, and it properly balances the state’s
interests in reliability and efficiency against the defendant’s unique
and powerful interests in presenting a complete defense.

